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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, the author hypothesizes that the use of computationally intensive math-
ematical operations in password authentication protocols can lead to security vulnera-
bilities in those protocols. In order to test this hypothesis:
1. A generalized algorithm for cryptanalysis was formulated to perform a clogging
attack (a formof denial of service) on protocols that use computationally intensive
modular exponentiation to guarantee security.
2. This technique was then applied to cryptanalyze four recent password authenti-
cation protocols, to determine their susceptibility to the clogging attack.
The protocols analyzed in this thesis differ in their usage of factors (smart cards, mem-
ory drives, etc.) or their method of communication (encryption, nonces, timestamps,
etc.). Their similarity lies in their use of computationally intensivemodular exponentia-
tion as a medium of authentication.
It is concluded that the strengths of all the protocols studied in this thesis can be com-
bined to make each of the protocols secure from the clogging attack. The conclusion is
supported by designing countermeasures for each protocol against the clogging attack.
x
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Multi-factor authentication protocols
User authentication can enable a perimeter device (e.g., a firewall, proxy server, VPN
server, or remote access server) to decide whether or not to approve a specific access
request to gain entry to a computer network. It is necessary to be able to identify and
authenticate any userwith a high level of certainty, so that the usermaybe held account-
able should his/her actions threaten the security and productivity of the network. The
more confidence a network administrator has regarding the user’s identity, the more
confidence the administrator will have in allowing that user specific privileges, and the
more faith the administrator will have in the internal records regarding that user.
Multi-factor authentication is an approach to cyber-security in which the user is re-
quired to provide more than one form of verification in order to prove his/her identity
and gain access to the system. It takes advantage of a combination of several authen-
tication factors. Commonly used factors include verification by (1) something a user
knows (such as a password), (2) something the user has (such as a smart card or a secu-
rity token), and (3) something the user is (such as the use of biometrics) (Stallings and
Brown, 2008). Due to their increased complexity, multi-factor authentication systems
are harder to breach than those using any single factor.
Smart cards are widely used in multi-factor authentication due to their relatively low
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cost, robust security, versatility and variety. Smart card based password authentica-
tion is one of themost convenient and effective two-factor (smart cards and passwords)
authentication mechanisms for remote systems (Chen et al., 2014; Islam, 2014; Jiang
et al., 2015; Li and Lee, 2012; Li et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2014). This technique has been
widely applied to various authentication applications, including remote host login, on-
line banking, e-commerce and e-health. Also, it constitutes the basis of three-factor
authentication. Challenges remain in both security and performance aspects of smart
card authenticationdue to the stringent security requirements and resource constraints
of the clients.
Manymulti-factor authentication protocols (Beller et al., 1993;Huang et al., 2003; Kocher
and Jaffe, 2001; Liao andWang, 2009) use computationally intensivemodular exponenti-
ation, a one-way function (see Appendix A), to guarantee security. The security provided
by modular exponentiation is due to its one-way nature, in other words, the hardness
of computing its inverse called the discrete logarithm problem. But due to the compu-
tationally intensive nature of modular exponentiation, its use leaves a security loophole
in protocols. An attacker can force the server or the client to waste resources by repeat-
edly performing unnecessary computations (due tomodular exponentiation), resulting
in clogging (a form of denial of service).
In this thesis, four recent multi-factor authentication protocols are analyzed for vulner-
ability. The first two, which are smart card based, differ in the fact that one (Yang et al.,
2014) uses encryption and a nonce (a random number) for verification, while the other
uses timestamps (Islam, 2014). The third multi-factor authentication protocol consid-
ered here is amemory device aided password authenticationprotocol (Jiang et al., 2013).
In this kind of protocol, the authentication information (issued by a server) is stored in
amemory device such as a universal serial bus (USB) stick, portable hard disk drive,mo-
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bile phone, PDA, PC, or, most recently, a software protection dongle (Jiang et al., 2013;
Chen et al., 2012; Rhee et al., 2009). The last protocol considered is also smart card based
and uses modular exponentiation for its security (Wang et al., 2013).
1.2 Contributions of this thesis
In order to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of the four protocols considered, the author
designed a generalized cryptanalysis algorithm to performclogging attacks on protocols
that use modular exponentiation for authentication purposes being forced to perform
useless modular exponentiation operations results in wastage of time and resources on
the part of the server, and thus denial of service for legitimate users.
1.3 Organization of this thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the
research done in this area prior to this work and discusses the techniques employed
in this work. Chapter 3 describes the generic algorithm that was developed to launch
the clogging attack on the various protocols analyzed in this work. Chapter 4 describes
the protocols in detail, the clogging attack on them, and solutions for preventing the
attack. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the work, discusses its significance, and proposes
possible future research directions.
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Chapter 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 Research on authentication protocols
This chapter summarizes the research done in the field of multi-factor authentication
protocols. The various kinds of attacks that are generally performed against these pro-
tocols are discussed, followed by two approaches to dealing with these attacks. Finally
the approach taken in this work is briefly described.
2.1.1 A research snapshot of security protocols
The design and security analysis of authentication protocols has been an active area
of research in recent years. Generally, the security vulnerability analysis of one or more
protocols leads to the design of newprotocols. However, inmost of these studies, the au-
thors present attacks on previous schemes and propose new protocols with assertions
of the superior aspects of their schemes,while ignoring benefits that their schemes don’t
attempt (or fail) to provide, thus overlooking dimensions on which they perform poorly.
New Protool → Broken → Improved Protool → Broken Again
→ Further Improved Protool → ···
In addition to the lack of evaluation criteria, another common feature of these studies
is that there is no proper security justification (or even an explicit security model) pre-
sented, which explains why these protocols previously claimed to be secure turn out to
be vulnerable. Such an approach has generated a lot of literature, yet as far as we know,
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little attention has been paid to systematic design and analysis. Fig. 2.1 summarizes the
relationships of the research studies done in this area to date.
Figure 2.1: A snapshot of authentication protocols (Wang et al., 2013).
2.1.2 Various kinds of attacks on the protocols
Most multi-factor authentication protocols have the following phases:
• Registration Phase. In this phase, the user registerswith the server with an identity
and password. The password is stored by the server and remains a secret between
the user and the server.
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• Login and Authentication Phase. In this phase, the user wants a service from the
server. It sends its identity and password to the server to gain a service. The server
then determines whether the user is legitimate by comparing the received values
of identity and password to the stored values. The server extends the desired ser-
vice to the legitimate user (Garrett et al., 2015).
Multi-factor authentication protocols are prone to various kinds of attacks. Some com-
mon kinds of attacks include:
• Brute Force Attack. In this kind of attack, the adversary simply tries out all possi-
ble combinations of alphabets to obtain the correct password. Alternatively, the
adversary could be a bitmore intelligent to try to guess the password by obtaining
some information about the user. Usually, users choose passwords which are easy
for them to remember. Hence, passwords contain things like the year of birth, or
a part of the user name or user ID. The adversary could gather such information
to simplify his efforts to break the password (Knudsen and Robshaw, 2011).
• Impersonation Attack. In this kind of attack, the adversary pretends to be a le-
gitimate user and gains access to the services meant for the legitimate user. The
adversarymight spoof the IP address of the legitimate user, or could intercept the
messages sent by the user and use them to gain access to the server (Wei-Chi and
Chang, 2005).
• Replay Attack. In this kind of attack, the adversary intercepts a message with the
identity and the password of the legitimate user. The adversary then waits till the
legitimate user logs out of the service. Then he replays themessage with the iden-
tity and the password to the server and gains access. Replay attacks are possible
even when the user identity and password are encrypted (Syverson, 1994).
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• Stolen smart card attack. In a password authentication scheme employing smart
cards, the smart card contains the identity and password of the legitimate user.
The stealing of the smart card by an adversary is equivalent to the stealing of a
credit card. The adversary could enjoy service until all the servers to which the
legitimate user has access are notified about the stolen smart card (Chen et al.,
2014).
• Stolen server database attack. In this kind of attack, the adversary steals the database
maintained by the server that contains the user identities and passwords of the le-
gitimate clients. The adversary now has enormous power to do anything at his
will (Wei-Chi et al., 2004).
• Insider attack. A legitimate user of one server could try to hack the credentials
of another user. The victim might have access to some other service which the
adversary does not. The adversary thus gains access to that service (Wood, 2000).
• Denial of service attack. The adversary tries to prevent legitimate users from ob-
taining the designated service. Various techniques are adopted by the adversary
to achieve this goal. This attack prevents the availability of a service rather than
compromising any information (confidentiality), or modifying unauthorized in-
formation (integrity) (Long and Thomas, 2001).
2.1.3 Approaches to develop secured protocols
Security has become an integral part of software design. Nowadays security is consid-
ered during the design and implementation of software rather than as an add on. There
are two approaches to analyzing software for security:
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• Static analysis. In this approach, the algorithm and the code after implementa-
tion are analyzed to find security vulnerabilities (Chess and McGraw, 2004; Gar-
rett et al., 2015; Harish and Roy, 2014; Roy et al., 2011; Talluri and Roy, 2014). The
advantage of static analysis is that it can find potential security violations without
executing the application or, in the case of an algorithm analysis, even before the
implementation is done.
• Dynamic analysis. In this approach, the software is executed and tested for poten-
tial vulnerabilities (Rahimi et al., 1993; Russo and Sabelfeld, 2010; Sobajic and Pao,
1989; Yasinsac, 2001). One well known technique is penetration testing in which
the tester tries to be a hacker to break into a system (Petukhov and Kozlov, 2008).
2.2 Methodology adopted in this thesis
In this thesis, static vulnerability analysis is employed on four multi-factor authentica-
tion protocols. Specifically, static vulnerability analysis is performed to conclude if these
protocols are vulnerable to clogging attack, a form of denial of service. The protocols an-
alyzed andmodified to produce new secured protocols have been listed in Chapter 1.
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Chapter 3
A GENERAL ALGORITHM FOR CLOGGING ATTACK
3.1 The algorithm
Most of the illustrations in this section is a repeat of an already publishedwork by the au-
thor in (Garrett et al., 2015). Themechanismofmost password authenticationprotocols
is that the client (usually a memory stick or a smart card reader) sends its credentials to
the server which then performs certainmathematical operations to verify those creden-
tials. The protocols usually work in different phases. All the phases will be discussed
when each protocol is considered individually. For now, the focus is on the login and
authenticationphases, in which the client is authenticated and the server authenticates
itself to the client.
In general, the attacker intercepts themessage from the client to server, which contains
the login credentials. This message is plaintext in some protocols and encrypted in
others. It might or might not contain a timestamp. These differences will be noted in
the protocols considered later. In either case, the attacker replays the intercepted mes-
sage several times to force the server to perform computationally intensive operations
(in this case modular exponentiation), thus forcing the server to waste its time and re-
sources. Legitimate users are thus denied services. Algorithm 1 shows the line of attack
developed by the author (Garrett et al., 2015).
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Algorithm 1 The general algorithm for a clogging attack (Garrett et al., 2015).
Intercept login message from client to server
if Timestamp is present then
Modify timestamp to match requirements
else
Keep message as is
end if
while The server is not completely clogged do
Replay the message to the server
end while
3.2 The clogging conditions
The clogging conditionswe analyze in this work are based on the computational and re-
source intensiveness of the operation ofmodular exponentiation. The energy consump-
tion of the modular exponentiation computation y ≡ g x (mod n) has been measured
in (Harish and Roy, 2014). In practice, to guarantee security, the modulus n is a very
large prime, and the exponent x, which is often a randomly chosen secret value, should
be very large as well. The researchers computed the energy consumed by modular ex-
ponentiation on two different platforms.
Figure 3.1: Energy consumption bymodular exponentiationwith exponents of various
sizes (Harish and Roy, 2014)
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Fig. 3.1, plots the energy consumed in Joules by the modular exponentiation operation
with a (randomly) fixed base g = 1024, modulus n = 32416187567, and the exponent
x ranging from values x = 16777216 to x = 536870912 on two different platforms. In
practice, the modulus and the exponent have very large values to guarantee security.
The energy generated due tomodular exponentiationwas observed to steadily increase
for large values of x.
Figure 3.2: Comparison of normalized energy consumption of different operations (on
log scale) (Harish and Roy, 2014)
To see how much energy is consumed by modular exponentiation in comparison to
common mathematical operations like addition, XOR, and multiplication, Harish and
Roy (2014) further plotted the normalized energy required by all four operations. They
measured energy consumed for the operations g x mod n, g + x + n, g ⊕ x ⊕ n, and
g × x ×n. Fig. 3.2 shows this comparison. It is evident from Fig. 3.2 that the energy
consumed bymodular exponentiation is two orders of magnitudemore than that of the
other operations.
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3.2.1 Analysis
In summary, any security protocol that usesmodular exponentiation to guarantee secu-
rity comes with high energy consumption and computational costs. Therefore, a pro-
tocol that uses modular exponentiation is vulnerable to the clogging attack, a form of
denial of service in which the attacker exploits the computational and energy intensive
nature of modular exponentiation (Garrett et al., 2015).
3.3 Choice of protocols
The protocols chosen for analysis in this thesis fall in the broad category of multifactor
authentication protocols. All of them use a password as one of the factors of authen-
tication. Selection of these protocols is based on their differences in the choice of the
second factor (smart cards,memory drives, etc.), and the tools to provide confidentiality
(encryption, nonces, timestamps, etc.).
Protocol Factors Used Confidentiality
Yang Password, Smart Card Usage of Nonces, Encryption
Islam Password, Smart Card Usage of Timestamps
Jiang Password, Memory Stick Usage of Timestamps
Wang Password, Smart Card Usage of RandomNumbers
Table 3.1: Summary of the Differences in the Protocols
Table 3.1 shows how the protocols the author has chosen to analyze are different from
each other. Their similarity lies in their use of modular exponentiation as a medium for
authentication.
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Chapter 4
CLOGGING ATTACK ON THE PROTOCOLS
In this chapter are described each of the protocols, the attacks on them, and the solu-
tions to foil the attacks. The following notations are used to describe the protocols.
• Z∗q denotes the finite field over q .
• ⊗ denote (bitwise) exclusive OR.
• A→B : M denotes the propagation of themessageM from user A to user B .
• ‖ denotes the concatenation operation.
• In cryptography, a nonce is an arbitrary number that may only be used once.
4.1 Yang’s protocol
The first protocol considered in this work was developed by Yang et al. (2014). It is a
smart card based password authentication protocol to preserve identity privacy. Yang’s
protocol is an improvement over Song’s protocol (Song, 2010) in that Song’s protocol
proved to be vulnerable against impersonation and insider attacks (Yang et al., 2014).
4.1.1 Review of the protocol
Yang’s protocol is presented in Algorithm 2. It works in four phases: Initialization, Reg-
istration, Login, and Authentication. Yang et al. (2014) showed this protocol to be im-
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mune from various attacks.
4.1.2 Attack on Yang’s protocol
An adversary A has the same capabilities as assumed by Yang et al. (Yang et al., 2014)
while they exposed the weaknesses of Song’s protocol (Song, 2010). A needs only to be
able to read and modify the contents of messages over an insecure channel during the
Login and Authentication phase of the protocol in order to launch a clogging attack.
1. A intercepts a valid login request ({Wi ,Ci }) from Step L3 (Algorithm 2).
2. Since the message is unencrypted, A changes Ci to any random garbage value
CA .
3. A then sends {Wi ,CA } to the server S.
The following is performed by the server S:
1. S decryptsWi to retrieve IDi , (Ri ⊗Ki ) and, Ni . Verifies that IDi is valid from its
stored value. Here it is valid. S then computes Ki = h(IDi )
x mod (p ⊗Ni ) and
R ′
i
= (Ri ⊗Ki )⊗Ki , and comparesCA with h(Ni‖R
′
i
‖IDi‖Wi‖Ki ). This fails, so the
request gets rejected.
Adversary A would now repeat the steps several times and make the server S compute
themodular exponentiation step several times. A can potentially change all the incom-
ing login requestmessages from any legitimateuser to S. Sincemodular exponentiation
is computationally intensive, the victimized server spends considerable computing re-
sources doing useless modular exponentiation rather than any real work. ThusA clogs
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Algorithm 2 Yang et. al.’s (2014) protocol for password authentication
In itialization Phase
Server S
1. Step I1. Choose large prime numbers p and q such that p = 2q+1.
2. Step I2. Choose a private key x ∈ Z∗q
Registration Phase
User Ui
1. Step R1. Choose identity IDi , password PWi , and random number b.
2. Step R2. Compute h(b⊗PWi ).
3. Step R3. Ui→S: {IDi ,h(b⊗PWi )} through a secure channel.
Server S
1. Step R4. On receiving the registration message fromUi , S creates an entry for
Ui in the account-database and stores IDi in this entry. Next, S computes Bi =
h(IDi )
x ⊗h(b⊗PWi ) mod p.
2. Step R5. S stores {IDi ,Bi ,h(·),p,q ,FS(·)} in a smart card and issues it to the
user.
User Ui
1. Step R6. Upon receiving the smart card, the user enters random number b in
it.
Login and Authentiation
User Ui
1. Step L1. Smart card generates a random number Ri , and nonce Ni .
2. Step L2. Smart card computes Ki = Bi ⊗h(b ⊗PWi )⊗Ni , Wi = FS(IDi ,Ri ⊗
Ki ,Ni ), andCi = h(Ni‖Ri‖IDi‖Wi‖Ki ).
3. Step L3. Ui→S: {Wi ,Ci }.
Server S
1. Step V1. S decrypts Wi to retrieve IDi , (Ri ⊗Ki ) and, Ni . Verifies whether
IDi is valid from its stored value. If not, the request is dropped, and the ses-
sion is terminated. Otherwise, S computes Ki = h(IDi )
x mod (p ⊗Ni ) and
R ′
i
= (Ri ⊗Ki )⊗Ki , and comparesCi with h(Ni‖R
′
i
‖IDi‖Wi‖Ki ). If they are not
equal the session is terminated. Otherwise S authenticates Ui and the login
request is accepted. S generates a nonce N j , and computes session key sk =
h(IDi‖Ni‖N j ‖R
′
i
), andmessage authentication codeCS = h(sk‖IDi‖R
′
i
‖N j ).
2. Step V2. S→Ui : {CS ,N j }.
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 Yang et. al.’s (2014) scheme (cont’d.)
User Ui
1. Step V3. On receiving the reply message from the server S, smart card com-
putes session key sk = h(IDi‖Ni‖N j ‖Ri ), and message authentication code
C ′S = h(IDi‖Ri‖N j ), and verifies whether CS and C
′
S are equal. This equiva-
lency authenticates the legitimacy of the server S, and mutual authentication
between S andUi is achieved. Otherwise S is not authenticated.
S with useless work and denies service to legitimate users. A needs only the ID of a
single valid user to perform the clogging attack repeatedly.
4.1.3 Proposed countermeasures to the attack
The vulnerability of this protocol is due to the fact that no timestamp checking is used
in order to work around clock synchronization problems between the user and server.
Nonces are used, but not to prevent a replay by the adversary (which clogs the server).
At the beginning of the authentication phase, the server could check whether the net-
work address of the user is valid. To do this, it has to know the network addresses of all
the registered legitimate users. In spite of that, adversary A could spoof the network
address of a legitimate user and replay the login message. To prevent this, a cookie ex-
change step may be added at the beginning of the login phase of Yang’s scheme. This
step was designed in the well-known Oakley key exchange protocol (Orman, 1998), as
follows:
1. User Ui chooses a pseudo-random number n1 and sends it along with the mes-
sage {Wi ,Ci }.
2. Server S, upon receiving the message, acknowledges the message and sends its
own cookie n2 toUi .
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3. The next message from Ui must contain n2, else S rejects the message and the
login request.
4.1.3.1 Security analysis of the solution.
Had A spoofed theUi ’s IP address, A would not get n2 back from S. A only succeeds
in having S send back an acknowledgement, but S doesn’t perform the computationally
intensive modular exponentiation. Therefore the clogging attack is avoided by these
additional steps. However, this process does not completely prevent the clogging attack
but only thwarts it to some extent. This fix can fully work if n1 and n2 are encrypted,
respectively, by theUi ’s and S’s private keys for secure communication.
4.1.3.2 Another solution
Another fix would be of course to add a timestamp Ti to Wi . Since Wi is encrypted,
the adversary cannot change the timestamp to do the replay. The server can check the
validity of the timestamp before it does the modular exponentiation step.
4.2 Islam’s protocol
The second protocol is that of Islam (2014). It is again a smart card based remote user
password authentication protocol. Islam’s protocol is an improvement over Li’s proto-
col (Li et al., 2013), which Islam (2014) showed to be vulnerable against attacks such as
stolen smart card, offline password guessing, and insider attack. Islam’s protocol has
been shown to be immune to various attacks (Islam, 2014).
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4.2.1 Review of Islam’s protocol
Islam’s protocol works in five phases: Registration, Login, Authentication, Password
Change, and Stolen Smart card Revocation (Islam, 2014). The protocol, presented in
Algorithm 3, omits the last two phases since they are not important in the clogging at-
tack demonstration.
Algorithm 3 Islam’s scheme of password authentication
Registration Phase
User Ui
1. Step R1. Choose identity IDi .
2. Step R2. Ui→S: IDi through a secure channel.
Server S
1. Step R3. On receiving the registrationmessage fromUi , S chooses a new smart
card and extracts SIDi as its identity. Next, S computesCi = h(IDi‖x‖SIDi ).
2. Step R4. S stores {Ci ,p,q ,h(·)} in a smart card and issues it to the user. S stores
(IDi ,SIDi ) forUi in its database.
User Ui
1. Step R5. Upon receiving the smart card, the user enters password PWi in it.
The smart card computes Bi = Ci ⊗ h(PWi ) = h(IDi‖x‖SIDi )⊗ h(PWi ) and
Ai = C
PWi
i
mod p = h(IDi‖x‖SIDi ) mod p. Now, the smartcard replaces
Ci by Bi and stores Ai . Finally, the smart card contains the information
{Ai ,Bi ,h(·),p,q}.
Login and Authentiation
User Ui
1. Step L1. Ui attaches the smart card to an input device and keys his/her
(IDi ,PWi ) into the smart card.
2. Step L2. The smart card computes Ci = Bi ⊗h(PWi ) and A
∗
i
= CPWi mod p.
The smart card then verifies A∗
i
= Ai . If they are not equal, the smart card
rejectsUi ’s login request, otherwise goes to the next step.
3. Step L3. The smart card picks the current timestamp Ti , α ∈Zp and computes
Di =C
α
i
mod p = h(IDi‖x‖kSIDi )
α mod p,Mi = h(IDi‖Ci‖Di‖Ti ).
4. Step L4. Ui→S: {IDi ,Di ,Mi ,Ti }.
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 Islam’s protocol (contd.)
Server S
1. Step V1. S checks if IDi is valid from its stored value, and TS −Ti ≤∆Ti . If not,
the request is dropped, and the session is terminated. Otherwise, S computes
C ′
i
= h(IDi‖x‖SIDi ) andM
′
i
= h(IDi‖C
′
i
‖Di‖Ti ), and comparesMi withM
′
i
. If
they are not equal the session is terminated. Otherwise S authenticatesUi and
the login request is accepted.
2. Step V2. S chooses β ∈ Z∗p , computes Vi = (C
′
i
)β mod p and the session key
sk =D
β
i
mod p.
3. Step V3. S selects a current timestamp Ts , computes Ms =
h(IDi‖C
′
i
‖Vi‖sk‖Ts).
4. Step V4. S→Ui : {IDi ,Vi ,Ms ,Ts}.
User Ui
1. Step V5. On receiving the reply message from the server S, smart card checks
the timestamp. If valid, computes session key sk ′ = V α
i
mod p, and M ′s =
h(IDi‖C
′
i
‖Vi‖sk
′‖Ts), and verifies whether Ms and M
′
s are equal. This equiv-
alency authenticates the legitimacy of the server S, andmutual authentication
between S andUi is achieved. Otherwise S is not authenticated.
4.2.2 Attack on Islam’s protocol
Again, A needs only to be able to read and modify the contents of messages over an
insecure channel (during the Login and Authentication phase of the protocol).
1. A intercepts a valid login request ({IDi ,Di ,Mi ,Ti }) from step Step L4.
2. Since the message is unencrypted, A changes Ti to TA to pass the timestamp
check.
3. A then sends {IDi ,Di ,Mi ,TA } to the server S.
The server S performs steps V1 through V4 since the timestamp check of V1 passes. The
adversary A would now repeat the steps several times and make the server S compute
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the computationally intensive modular exponentiation of Step V2 several times. Thus,
as in the previous case, the server gets clogged doing unnecessary computations.
4.2.3 Proposed countermeasures to the attack
The vulnerability of this protocol is due to the fact the message {IDi ,Di ,Mi ,Ti } is not
encrypted. We could use the strength of Yang’s protocol (Yang et al., 2014) here and
design a function FS to encrypt Ti . This prevents A from changing Ti , and hence also
prevents the replay, which leads to clogging attack.
4.3 Jiang’s password based protocol
The next protocol considered is that of Jiang (Jiang et al., 2013). It is a remote authentica-
tion protocol which does not involve smart cards. However, Jiang et al. also had another
version of the protocol which works with smart cards (Jiang et al., 2015). Both protocols
are vulnerable to clogging attacks. Jiang’s protocol (Jiang et al., 2013) is an improvement
over Chen’s protocol (Chen et al., 2012) which they proved to be vulnerable against the
off-line dictionary attack.
4.3.1 Review of the protocol
Jiang’s protocol works in five phases: Initialization, Registration, Login, Authentication,
and Password Change. Jiang’s group showed that their remote authentication protocol
was immune to various attacks (Jiang et al., 2013). The protocol is presented in Algo-
rithm 4. The password change phase is omitted since it is not required to demonstrate
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the effect of the clogging attack on the protocol.
4.3.2 Attack on Jiang et al.’s protocol
Adversary A has the same capabilities and knowledge as assumed by Jiang (Jiang et al.,
2013) while exposing the weaknesses of Chen’s protocol. A needs only to be able to
read and modify the contents of messages over an insecure channel (during Login and
Authentication phase of the protocol) in order for the protocol to be susceptible to at-
tack.
1. A intercepts a valid login request ({IDi ,Ci ,Vi ,T1}) from step Step L3.
2. Since the message is unencrypted, A can change the timestamp T1 to some TA
so that it meets the criterion (T2−TA )<∆T .
3. A changesCi to any random garbage valueCA .
4. A then sends {IDi ,CA ,Vi ,TA } to the server S.
The following is performed by the server S:
1. Check whether IDi is valid. Here it is valid.
2. Check whether the difference between (T2−TA )<∆T . This step passes as well.
3. Compute Y ′′
i
=H (IDi‖x) andD
′
i
=C x
A
mod p, and compare Vi withH (IDi‖Y
′′
i
‖CA ‖D
′
i
‖TA ). This fails, so the request gets rejected.
Adversary A would now repeat the steps several times and make the server S compute
themodular exponentiation step several times. A can potentially change all the incom-
ing login requestmessages from any legitimateuser to S. Sincemodular exponentiation
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Algorithm 4 Jiang’s scheme of password authentication
In itialization Phase
Server S
1. Step I1. Choose large prime numbers p and q such that p = 2q+1.
2. Step I2. Choose a generator g of Z∗q , secret key x ∈ Z
∗
q , and secure oneway hash
H .
3. Step I3. Compute public key X = g x mod p.
Registration Phase
User Ui
1. Step R1. Choose identity IDi , password PWi .
2. Step R2. Ui→S: {IDi ,PWi } through a secure channel.
Server S
1. Step R3. On receiving the registration message fromUi , S creates an entry for
Ui in the account-database and stores IDi in this entry. Next, S computes Yi =
H (IDi‖x))⊗H (PWi ).
2. Step R4. S→Ui : {X ,Yi ,H ,p,q}.
User Ui
1. Step R5. Upon receiving {X ,Yi ,H ,p,q} from S,Ui enters it locally in his/her
memory device (e.g. USB stick).
Login and Authentiation
User Ui
1. Step L1. Ui chooses a random number α ∈ Z
∗
q .
2. Step L2. Ui computesY
′
i
= Yi⊗H (PWi ),Ci = g
α mod p,Di = x
α mod p, and
Vi =H (IDi‖Y
′
i
‖Ci‖Di‖T1), where T1 is the current system time ofUi .
3. Step L3. Ui→S: {IDi ,Ci ,Vi ,T1}.
Server S
1. Step V1. S checks whether IDi is valid from its stored value, and (T2−T1) <
∆T , where T2 is the current system time for S. If either does not hold, the
request is dropped, and the session is terminated. Otherwise, S computes
Y ′′
i
= H (IDi‖x) and D
′
i
= C x
i
mod p = g xα mod p = Xα mod p = Di , and
compares Vi with H (IDi‖Y
′′
i
‖Ci‖D
′
i
‖T1). If they are not equal the session is
terminated. Otherwise S authenticatesUi and the login request is accepted. S
computesMi =H (IDi‖D
′
i
‖T3), where T3 is the current system time of S.
2. Step V2. S→Ui : {Mi , t3}.
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 Jiang’s scheme (contd.)
User Ui
1. Step V3. On receiving the reply message from the server S,Ui checks whether
T3 is valid, and Mi is equal to H (IDi‖Di‖T3). This equivalency authenticates
the legitimacy of the server S, and mutual authentication between S andUi is
achieved. Otherwise S is not authenticated.
Compute Session Key
User Ui
skU =H (Di )
Server S
skS =H (D
′
i
)
is computationally intensive, the victimized server spends considerable computing re-
sources doing useless modular exponentiation rather than any real work. ThusA clogs
S with useless work and denies service to legitimateusers. A needs just an ID of a single
valid user to perform the clogging attack repeatedly.
4.3.3 Clogging attack performed on other similar schemes
Jiang’s group devised a smart card based password authentication protocol (Jiang et al.,
2015). This work was an improvement over another such scheme by Chen et al. (2014b).
This researcher observes that the clogging attack performed on the current protocol un-
der consideration is also effective against both Jiang’s (Jiang et al., 2015) andChen’s (Chen
et al., 2014) smart card protocols. Both protocols are vulnerable because the user’s smart
card does not encrypt the message it sends over to the server for login and authentica-
tion. This gives an adversary the chance to manipulate the message.
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4.3.4 Proposed countermeasures to the attack
The proposed countermeasures to the attack on Jiang’s protocol are on similar lines to
those already seen for the two previous protocols. They are illustrated along with their
security analysis in the next sections.
4.3.4.1 Steps to avoid the clogging attack
At the beginning of the authentication phase, the server could check whether the net-
work address of the user is valid. It has to know the network addresses of all the regis-
tered legitimate users. In spite of that, adversary A could spoof the network address of
a legitimateuser and replay the loginmessage. A countermeasuremight be the addition
of a cookie exchange step at the beginning of the login phase of Jiang’s scheme. This step
has been designed as in the well known Oakley key exchange protocol (Orman, 1998).
1. User Ui chooses a pseudo-random number n1 and sends it along with the mes-
sage {IDi ,Ci ,Vi ,T1}.
2. Server S upon receiving the message, acknowledges the message and sends its
own cookie n2 toUi .
3. The next message from Ui must contain n2, else S rejects the message and the
login request.
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4.3.4.2 Security analysis of the solution
HadA spoofed theUi ’s IP address,A would not get n2 back from S. HenceA succeeds
only in having S send back an acknowledgement, but not in launching the computation-
ally intensive modular exponentiation. Hence the clogging attack is avoided. However,
this process does not prevent the clogging attack but only thwarts it to some extent. This
fix can fully work if n1, and n2 are encrypted respectively by theUi ’s and S’s private keys
for secure communication.
4.4 Wang’s smart card based protocol
Wang’s group (Wang et al., 2013) has reported a smart card based authentication proto-
col. They claim their protocol to be immune to denial of service attacks. To illustrate
this, they assume a situation of a stolen smart card.
4.4.1 Review of the protocol
Wang’s protocol, like most smart card based protocols, has the Registration, Login, and
Verification phases. The protocol is presented in Algorithm 5. To perform a clogging at-
tack on their protocol, the attacker would not have to steal the smart card. The clogging
attack on the protocol presented here is done via replay. A replay is not necessary, but a
replay step by the attacker makes the clogging attack more effective. Most of the smart
card based protocols cited byWang et al. (2013) are vulnerable to this attack.
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Algorithm 5 Wang’s protocol for password authentication
Registration Phase
User Ui
1. Step R1. Choose identity IDi , password PWi and a random number b.
2. Step R2. Ui→S: IDi ,H0(b‖PWi ).
3. Step R3. Upon receiving the smart card SC ,Ui enters b into SC .
Server S
1. Step R4. On receiving the registration message from Ui at time T , S first
checks whether Ui is a registered user. If it is Ui ’s initial registration, S cre-
ates an entry for Ui in the account-database and stores (IDi ,Treg = T ) in
this entry. Otherwise, S updates the value of Treg with T in the existing en-
try for Ui . Next, S computes Ni = H0(b‖PWi ))⊗H0(x‖IDi‖Treg ) and Ai =
H0((H0(IDi )⊗H0(b‖PWi )) mod n).
2. Step R5. S→Ui : A smart card containing security parameters
{Ni ,Ai ,q ,g , y ,n,H0(·),H1(·),H2(·),H3(·)}.
User Ui
1. Step R6. Upon receiving the smart card SC ,Ui enters b into SC .
Login and Authentiation
User Ui
1. Step L1. Ui inserts her smart card into the card reader and inputs ID
∗
i
, PW ∗
i
.
2. Step L2. SC computes A∗
i
=H0((H0(ID
∗
i
)⊗H0(b‖PW
∗
i
)) mod n) and verifies
the validity of ID∗
i
and PW ∗
i
by checking whether A∗
i
equals the stored Ai . If
the verification holds, it implies ID∗
i
= IDi and PW
∗
i
= PWi with a probability
of n−1
n
(≈ 99.90
100
, when n = 210) . Otherwise, the session is terminated.
3. Step L3. SC chooses a random number u and computesC1 = g
u mod p, Y1 =
yu mod p, k =H0(x‖IDi‖Treg ) = Ni ⊗H0(b‖PWi ), C IDi = IDi ⊗H0(C1‖Y1)
andMi =H0(Y1‖k‖C IDi ).
4. Step L4. Ui→S: {C1,C IDi ,Mi }.
Server S
1. Step V1. S computes Y1 = (C1)
x mod p using its private key x. Then, S derives
IDi =C IDi⊗H0(C1‖Y1) and checkswhether IDi is in the correct format. If IDi
is not valid, the session is terminated. Then, S computes k =H0(x‖IDi‖Treg )
andM∗
i
=H0(Y1‖k‖C IDi ), where Treg is extracted from the entry correspond-
ing to IDi . If M
∗
i
is not equal to the received Mi , the session is terminated.
Otherwise, S generates a random number v and computes the temporary key
KS = (C1)
v mod p,C2 = g
v mod p andC3 =H1(IDi‖IDS‖Y1‖C2‖k‖KS).
2. Step V2. S→Ui : {C2,C3}.
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 Wang’s scheme (cont’d.)
User Ui
1. Step V3. On receiving the reply message from the server S, SC computes
KU = (C2)
u mod p,C∗3 =H1(IDi‖IDS‖Y1‖C2‖k‖KU ), and comparesC
∗
3 with
the received C3. This equivalency authenticates the legitimacy of the server S,
andUi goes on to computeC4=H2(IDi‖IDS‖Y1‖C2‖k‖KU ).
2. Step V4. Ui→S: {C4}
Server S
1. Step V5. Upon receiving {C4} from Ui , the server S first computes C
∗
4 =
H2(IDi‖IDS‖Y1‖C2‖k‖KS) and then checks ifC
∗
4 equals the received value of
C4. If this verification holds, S authenticates the userUi and the login request
is accepted else the connection is terminated.
Compute Session Key
User Ui
• skU =H3(IDi‖IDS‖Y1‖C2‖k‖KU )
Server S
• skS =H3(IDi‖IDS‖Y1‖C2‖k‖KS)
4.4.2 Replay Attack onWang’s protocol
A replay attack is a form of network attack in which a valid data transmission is mali-
ciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. Replays can be used to gain unauthorized
access, or may be done simply to perform a denial of service. This is carried out either
by the originator or by an adversary who intercepts the data and retransmits it, possibly
as part of a masquerade attack by IP packet substitution (such as stream cipher attack).
Wang’s protocol (Wang et al., 2013) was claimed to be secured against replay attacks,
but as we see, this author has been able to perform a replay attack on Wang’s protocol
to achieve a denial of service. We assume the attackerA has complete knowledge of the
protocol (i.e. not security under obscurity).
1. A intercepts a valid login request ({C1,C IDi ,Mi }) from Step L4.
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2. A replays {C1,C IDi ,Mi } several times. That is, it performs A→S: {C1,C IDi ,Mi }
a large number of times.
3. Thiswill force Si perform threemodular exponentiationsY1 = (C1)
x mod p,KS =
(C1)
v mod p, andC2 = g
v mod p of Step V1.
4. A can intercept whatever replies Stepi sends (Step V1) and discard them (they
would anyway be lost since SC will not expect these replies).
The attacker A can simply send fake login requests to the server S and could have
launched the clogging attack by forcing S to perform Y1 = (C1)
x mod p on Step V1. But
this replay attack results in a bigger DoS attack on S since it is forced to perform three
modular exponentiations (in place of just one). A will need to send fewer messages to S
to clog it. This replay attack is possible because, unlike Jiang’s protocol, Wang’s protocol
does not have a timestamp check on incomingmessages from the user(s) by S.
4.4.3 Proposed countermeasures to the attack
In the subsequent section a couple of countermeasures to the attack are illustrated. The
author observes the usage of timestamps and their verifications canmake this protocol
secure against replays leading to denial of service.
4.4.3.1 The steps to avoid replay attack resulting in clogging attack
Replay attacks on most smart card based protocols might be possible because their se-
curity relies on computationally intensive modular exponentiation, and the messages
are not by default encrypted. This vulnerability is often overlooked, since the natural
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result of a replay is not always denial of service. A few steps to avoid these attacks on
Wang’s protocol (and smart card based protocols in general) would be
1. Ui uses a time stamp T in Step L4., and S verifies it in Step V1.. The time stamp
also must be encrypted in some form so thatA cannot tamper with it.
2. S checks whether multiple login requests frequently come from the same user.
This step reduces but does not eliminate the chances of a replay, because A can
obtain a lot of valid user IDs (they are public) and send fake login requests period-
ically from different IDs. Alternatively, A can store various (valid) login requests
over a time period, and replay them periodically.
4.4.3.2 Yet another way to prevent a clogging attack
The mathematical basis which makes the protocols vulnerable to clogging attacks is
modular exponentiation. The complete preventionof this vulnerability requires encryp-
tion of all themessages betweenUi and S. But doing so would involve a key exchanging
step, in which each user has a private key and a public key. The server knows the public
key, and can decrypt amessage encrypted by a user’s private key. Thus, the servermakes
sure that themessage is from a valid user before it launches the costlymodular exponen-
tiation. This comes with a cost and depends on the level of security desired (Al-Riyami
and Paterson, 2003; Fujisaki and Okamoto, 1999;Wander et al., 2005). This countermea-
sure works for all protocols (smart card and non-smart card based).
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary of results
In this thesis, first, the protocols of Yang et al. (2014) and Islam (2014) are shown to be
vulnerable to the clogging attack. The vulnerability lies in the use of computationally
intensive modular exponentiation by the server in the authentication process. In this
analysis it is observed that using a combinationof encryption,a nonce, and a timestamp
would prevent clogging attack vulnerability in these two protocols.
The protocol by Jiang (2013a) is next analyzed. Jiang’s protocol is an improvement over
the protocol of Chen et al. (2012), which they show to be insecure against offline pass-
word guessing attacks. Other protocols, for example that of Rhee et al. (2009), preceded
Chen’s protocol also have been shown to be vulnerable to attack. This author finds
Jiang’s protocol to be insecure against clogging attacks. The vulnerability again lies in
the use of computationally intensive modular exponentiation by the server in the au-
thenticationprocess. Another recent protocol by the same researchers (Q. Jiang, 2013b),
which is smart card based, is also observed to be insecure against clogging attacks. A
solution is then presented by the author to prevent an attacker from carrying out such
an attack on the protocol.
The final protocol analyzed is a smart card based protocol by Wang et al. (2013), which
has been claimed to be secure against denial of service. However, the results here show
that an attacker can exploit the fact that the protocol uses multiple modular exponenti-
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ations for authentication. A replay attack can be launched on the protocol to achieve a
bigger clogging attack. A clogging attack can also be done on this protocol in the classi-
cal way (without replays). A strategy formaking the protocol secure against this attack is
proposed by the author; this fix alsomakes the protocol of Jiang (2013a) immune against
clogging attacks.
It is observed that modular exponentiation guarantees a level of security, but it might
create a vulnerability if it is used without an additional level of protection. Most of
the multi-factor authentication protocols in the literature, whether smart card based or
memory device aided, rely on modular exponentiation for their security. Hence, some
level of protection should be added to them to guarantee increased security against clog-
ging attacks.
Table 5.1 summarizes the results obtained in this work. It is evident that most of the
protocols are vulnerable to the classical clogging attack.
Protocol Mode of Attack Countermeasure
Yang Classical clogging Timestamps
Islam Classical clogging Encryption
Jiang Classical clogging Cookie Exchanging
Wang Replay attack1 Timestamps
Table 5.1: Summary of the Results
The last column of Table 5.1 suggests the strengths of the protocols could be combined
to prevent the clogging attack on them. However, it must be emphasized that as ev-
1Also classical clogging.
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erything has costs involved, the level of security needed will determine the nature of
countermeasure.
5.2 Conclusion
In this thesis, clogging attacks on four advanced multi-factor authentication protocols
have been demonstrated. The goal of this work is to uncover the subtleties and chal-
lenges in designing this type of protocol. While modular exponentiation guarantees a
level of security, this work shows that modular exponentiation might lead to an easily-
exploitable vulnerability if it is used without an additional level of protection. Most of
the multi-factor authentication protocols in the literature, whether smart card based
or memory device aided, rely on modular exponentiation for their security. Therefore,
some level of protection should be added to them to guarantee total security against
clogging attacks.
5.3 Directions for future research
Research on multi-factor authentication protocols is ongoing. An interesting direction
would be to investigatewhether protocols that use Elliptic CurveCryptography (ECC) to
guarantee security are less vulnerable to clogging attacks than those that rely on modu-
lar exponentiation.
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Appendix A
MODULAR EXPONENTIATION
A.1 Background onmodular exponentiation
Modular arithmetic is also called clock arithmetic because like a clock, the hour that
comes after 12 is 1 instead of 13. We count 1,2,3, · · ·10,11,12,1,2,3, · · ·10,11,12,1,2,3, · · · .
Example. 7+8 mod 12≡ 3 mod 12. In this example we would say that “7 plus 8 is con-
gruent to 3 mod 12", because 15 divided by 12 leaves a remainder of 3. The remainder is
always a whole number less than the divisor ormodulus n, {0,1,2, · · · ,n−2,n−1}. In the
example, we could have used any counting number andmultiplied it by 12 and added 3
to get a value that is congruent to 15 mod 12. Thus, 27, 39, and 51 are all congruent to
15 mod 12 because when they are divided by 12, they yield the same remainder.
A card game example. An example of modular arithmetic can be shown with a game
of cards. When a standard 52 card deck is dealt among 5 players, 1 at a time, the dealer
might count 1,2,3,4,5 · · ·1,2,3,4,5 · · · until all the cards are used except the last 2. That
might be written as 2≡ 52 mod 5, that is 52 divided by 5 gives each player 10 cards with
2 left over. If there were 4 players instead of 5 then 0 ≡ 52 mod 4. Each player would
receive 13 cards and there would be none left over.
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A.1.1 Exponentiation
Exponentiation is raising a base number to a power. In this thesis we restrict those num-
bers to the set of counting numbers. For example 73 = 7×7×7.
A.1.2 Factoring
Factoring is the process of taking a counting number and writing it as the product of its
prime factors. Example: 30,030= 2×3×5×7×11×13. 30029 is prime. Determining that
a number is prime by factoring takes more time and energy or computer cycles than
generating that prime.
A.1.3 Modular Exponentiation
Modular Exponentiation is used to generate a congruence with the input of a base, ex-
ponent and modulus. An example: With a base of 7, exponent of 3 and a divisor of 13,
the congruence would equal 5 (since 5≡ 73 mod 13).
A.1.4 Discrete Logarithm Problem and Security
The discrete logarithm is why modular exponentiation is considered useful in cryptog-
raphy. Discrete logarithm is the process of taking a known congruence, base andmodu-
lus and finding the exponent from modular exponentiation. For example, the problem
5 ≡ 7x mod 13 is impractical to solve for x with current computer technology for large
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exponents that are generated using large primes. As the sizes of the prime numbers
used to generate the exponent get larger so does the difficulty in factoring the product.
A.2 Applications in computer security
Why is modular exponentiation important to computer security? If a stored or transmit-
ted password or other sensitive information is read by an unauthorized user, that infor-
mationmay be used to the detriment of a legitimate user or to compromise a system or
network. A solution for that problem might be to encrypt the stored data or transmis-
sion in such a way that it is impractical for an unauthorizeduser to access it, but is easily
accessible by an authorized user. A simple way to encrypt such data is to take a letter,
or a numerical representation of it, and use that number as input inmathematical func-
tion to provide a result that is not equal to the input, but that can be converted back to
that input value. This process can be extended to any numerical representation, such
as a file that might contain a picture or text.
A symmetric key encryption scheme uses a single shared number to encrypt messages
between users. A very simple example of this might be the substitution cipher that sub-
stitutes a ‘B’ for an ‘A’, a ‘C’ for a ‘B’ and so on. So a message such as “This is a test."
with substitution only of the letters might come out “Uijt jt b uftu.". The reverse sub-
stitution would restore the message. In other words, add 1 to the letter to encrypt and
subtract 1 to decrypt. This example of a fast and easy symmetric encryption scheme
can be changed so that instead of adding or subtracting 1, you can do so with any count-
ing number, but this does not add any security. Some of the problems with symmetric
key encryption are that anyone who knows how it works and has the key can decipher
any message, make his own encoded messages and imitate another user, or change the
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contents of a message without detection. Other protocols or schemes used to hide and
reveal the data are without these faults.
An asymmetric encryption scheme uses a public key which can be used by anyone to
hide data which can only be revealed by a complementary private key. The public key is
also used to reveal the datawhichwas hidden by using the private key. Among themath-
ematical functions available for asymmetric key generation, modular exponentiation is
the most commonly used. One popular implementation using this one-way function
is the RSA algorithm. Many descriptions of the RSA algorithm are available, but one
simple example (Messerschmitt, 1999) will suffice here
The RSA algorithm is paraphrased here: Multiply two large prime numbers, a and b, to
generate a modulus,M . Apply Euler’s totient function to get a count of relatively prime
counting numbers less than M . This is computed by taking the product of a − 1 and
b−1 and is called φ(M). Find a relatively prime counting number less than φ(M), and
call it P . The public key is written as (M ,P ). The secret key may be determinedwith the
function: S ≡ P (φ(φ(M))−1) mod φ(M) and is written (M ,S).
An example of this algorithm follows: Take two prime numbers and multiply them to-
gether. a = 19, b = 23.
This product will be used for the modulus in a modular exponential. M = a×b = 437.
The RSA algorithm uses Euler’s totient function to get the number of relatively prime
counting numbers less than M . φ(M) = (a − 1)(b − 1) =. (19− 1)(23− 1) = 18× 22 =
(20−2)(20+2)= 400−4= 396. Which is the count of relatively prime natural numbers
less than 437. Therefore φ(437)= 396.
– 39 –
Choose a number that is relatively prime to 396, that is it has no factors in common.
396 = 2×2×3×3×11. A relatively prime number might be 5×13= 65, since it has no
factors in common with 396 nor 437. We will use this number in our public key. Set the
value of P = 65. The public key is then (M ,P )= (437,65).
To find the private key use S ≡ P (φ(φ(M))−1) mod φ(M). See Euler’s product formula
to find φ(n). If the factors of a number can be written as (F
p1
1 )(F
p2
2 ) · · · (F
pn
n ) φ(n) =
n(1/ f1)(1/ f2) · · · (1/ fn) In this case the totient of 396 is φ(396) = (396)(1/2)(1/3)(1/11)=
2×3 = 6 and using that value to plug into the exponent part of the private key formula
φ(φ(437))=φ(396)= 6 and 6−1= 5.
A private key then is 329 ≡ 655 mod 396. That is the private, secret, key is (M ,S) =
(437,329). Note that 1≡ 65×329 mod 396, and in general 1≡ P ×S mod φ(M).
To demonstrate how these public/private keys work, choose a number to encrypt such
as 42. Using the keys generated above (M ,P ) = (437,65) and (M ,S) = (437,329). Since
238 ≡ 4265 mod 437, the encryption of 42 gives a result of 238. The decryption of 238
gives a result of 42, since 42≡ 238329 mod 437.
A user may encrypt amessage with his private key and anyone can use the public key to
decrypt it. Since that user is the only one that can use the private key, it follows that he is
the one that sent themessage, which is a guarantee of identity. If themessage were tam-
pered with, the decryption would fail, and so what is received is guaranteed to be what
was sent. When the public key is given, attempting to determine the initial large prime
numbers or private key is called the discrete logarithm problem, and it is impractical to
solve with current computer resources given sufficiently large initial primes.
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Asymmetric encryption using this private/public key method requires more time to en-
crypt and decrypt a message than a simpler symmetric key. However, a symmetric key
allows anyone who knows it to decrypt or encrypt a message. A common scheme is
to use an asymmetric key pair to send to the recipient a symmetric (session) key that
is encrypted with his public key. The recipient then decrypts the symmetric (session)
key and uses it in a much faster message transfer. No one else has that session key, so
the messages are kept private between the sender and recipient. If another session is
needed, another session key can be shared. That method gives both the sender and
the receiver some of the security of asymmetric encryption and the speed of symmetric
encryption.
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